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The industrialization of the United States in the nineteenth century
provides a model for successful emerging capital markets. After the
American Revolution, the new nation was a "maple syrup republic." By
1900, the United States was an industrial giant. The early republic
needed massive amounts of capital to conquer the continent. American
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capital markets and their Big Businesses (such as railroads) created
great liquidity and a monitoring system that protected diverse domestic
and foreign investors - funneling even more capital to Wall Street.
This article traces the development of capital markets in the United
States and the coincident critical separation of ownership from manage-
ment. Investors in the early eighteenth century were primarily family
members, partners, friends, and local people who could directly oversee
the operations of the enterprise and who had enough knowledge to
ensure it was properly run. As enterprises grew larger, especially
canals and railroads that tied large areas together, capital needs
exceeded local resources and the management required could not
depend on only one person or family.
Investors in large enterprises, removed from direct observation and
more sophisticated in their operation than one person or family could
manage, required alternate mechanisms to guarantee that investments
were being used advantageously and investors' interests were being
protected. The key effective capital utilization mechanisms that evolved
in the United States were professional management hierarchies, with
regular reports and oversight, and a corporate structure of holding
rights in the enterprise, with shares that could be freely bought and sold.
Additionally, the vital capital accumulation and protection mechanisms
that developed were local and national banks, merchant bankers like J.
P. Morgan & Co., bond markets and stock exchanges with self-policing
policies, and representation of shareholder interests on the corporate
board.
The American experience demonstrates how separation of owner-
ship from management, sophisticated industrial monitoring, and equally
sophisticated monitoring of capital markets can lead to enormous eco-
nomic growth.
[lit is perhaps surprising that [the corporation] succeeded in
competition with other forms, such as the joint-stock company, busi-
ness trust, or limited partnership. It is even more surprising that it
succeeded in republican America well before aristocratic England.
The unique advantages of a corporation over other devices - such
as its permanent governance relations, quasi-monopoly status and
perhaps limited liability - must have been strong to outweigh the
political disadvantages of the corporate form. But early America did
not have great concentrations of wealth and perhaps needed these
advantages more than England.1
1. Joseph H. Sommer, The Birth of the American Business Corporation: Of Banks,
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much scholarly and practitioner writing has traced the legal and
historical development of the corporate form and capital markets in the
United States. However, nearly all of these works have omitted a criti-
cal piece of the puzzle in their analyses - the identity of the investor.
This article seeks to examine and uncover the changes in the legal, eco-
nomic, and moral personality of investors from 1790-1900,2 in order to
create a fuller understanding of the rise of corporations and coincident
separation of ownership from management 3 in nineteenth century indus-
trial America.4
The changes in investor behavior will be discussed against a back-
drop of several factors - judicial opinions, legislative action, advances
in technology, and economic conditions - the combination and interac-
tion of which have affected the evolution of the corporation. While
Corporate Governance, and Social Responsibility, 49 BuFF. L. REV. 1011, 1061 (2001). This
quote refers to the early formation of American corporations (1790-1830s) (mainly banks,
utilities, and roadways), when nearly all were chartered by special acts of legislatures and many
received "special privileges," which were later fought by the Jacksonians. The concept of the
"corporation" embodied in this quote is quite different from the picture of the "modem
corporation" at the end of the nineteenth century. The evolution of the corporation was due to the
combination and interaction of several factors, including judicial opinions (e.g., The Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)); legislative action (e.g., the
passage of general incorporation acts); advances in technology (e.g., the railroads and Corliss
steam engine); and economic conditions (e.g., the formation of capital markets).
The purpose of this article is to concentrate on the identity and personhood of the investor
and how the investor's legal, economic, and moral personality changed, as opposed to the
business's legal personality. In order to achieve this goal and get a real snapshot of the nineteenth
century, it is important to trace the corporation's evolution with regard to the above factors
(though not necessarily in great detail) and make inferences about the reactions, desires, and fears
of investors. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76
GEo. L.J. 1593 (1988). Hovenkamp lays out a good timeline for events.
2. Because the article concentrates on the change in investor personality and ends around
1900, it does not address the collapse of the markets with the Great Depression. That is beyond
the scope of this essay.
3. Professor Brian R. Cheffins ably argues, "A great merger wave occurring in the United
States between 1897 and 1903 ... was the single most important event in a process that yielded
the pattern of managerial control and dispersed share ownership which now distinguishes the
corporate economy in the U.S. from arrangements in most other countries." Brian R. Cheffins,
Investor Sentiment and Antitrust Law as Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure: The
Great Merger Wave of 1897 to 1903 1 (Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working
Paper 77, Dec. 2002), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/art77. This essay explains
how emerging capital markets and the gargantuan capital requirements of railroads created this
seismic shift in business structure.
4. "The separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of
owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which
formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear." ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 7 (1932). While this model does
have certain agency problems, the discipline of the market for control and the Wall Street option
protect investors by giving them weapons to crudely restrain unprincipled agents.
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most corporate characteristics are considered (e.g., the transferability of
shares,5 centralized management structures, and shareholder voting sys-
tems), others are not focused on in great detail (e.g., limited liability,
which was not terribly important in the nineteenth century6).
5. The other two Black Letter characteristics are limited liability (not terribly important in
the nineteenth century) and unlimited life for the enterprise. Neither is as significant as
marketable investments. Taken altogether, the corporate structure facilitates the lock-in of capital
and its retention for productive uses. Professor Blair believes this nineteenth century development
was critical to the development of the modem corporate enterprise. Margaret M. Blair, Locking in
Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the 19th Century, 51 UCLA
L. REv. 387 (2003). The capital lock-in, denying capricious withdrawals that plague partnerships,
and the liquidity offered by the modern plutocratic form and capital markets, created an
investment model second to none.
6. Although in the twentieth century limited liability came to be thought of as critical, a
good deal of evidence from the nineteenth century contradicts this conclusion.
First off, in the early nineteenth century, "small firms sometimes voluntarily wrote into their
corporate charters clauses that specified unlimited liability. Throughout the century, moreover, it
was common for the officers and leading stockholders of small corporations to endorse personally
their company's debts in order to secure commercial credit and bank loans." Therefore,
"whatever savings [limited liability] permitted in raising equity capital were offset by higher costs
in securing loans." Also, even if it did have the benefit of lowering transaction costs (i.e.,
transferring shares on securities markets), such benefits would only be felt by the largest
corporations (of which there were few). Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships, Corporations, and
the Theory of the Firm, 88 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 66, 67 (1998).
Furthermore, banks and other financial institutions often limited liability by issuing non-
recourse instruments, hence isolating their investors from liability if the bank defaulted on its
paper. Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. EcON.
HISTORY 1, 8-17 (1945).
Third, the legal environment of the day and people's views on risks and responsibility were
quite different. While there was contract and tort litigation, society was not as litigious as it is
now. Also, rules such as the "fellow servant rule" created barriers for tort victims.
In any case, questions of limited liability rarely came up in the early days of American
corporations. They first formed in economic sectors that were thought to involve relatively little
risk. Even if companies faltered, the government usually stepped in with the aid of lotteries, land
grants, and increased tolls. Id. at 16. Ultimately, the expansion of the corporate form into riskier
areas brought the question of liability to the fore:
In the beginning of the nineteenth century, state legislators tended to impose
unlimited liability on corporate shareholders apparently because of a belief that
without the security thus furnished to corporate creditors, manufacturing and
industrial concerns would not find it possible to amass the necessary capital with
which to operate their businesses, and thus ultimately to benefit the public. By the
fourth decade of the nineteenth century, however, virtually all of the state
legislatures appear to have arrived at the judgment that the furthering of capital
formation could best be accomplished by encouraging shareholders to invest
through limiting their liability.
Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and
Economics, 87 Nw. U.L. REV. 148, 155 (1992).
Judicial decisions by the courts in the first three decades of the nineteenth century also helped
to shape the emergence of limited liability. However, none of the changes in law or judicial
interpretations affected the rate of incorporation, reinforcing the view that limited liability was not
the driving force. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 6. But see Peter L. Rousseau & Richard Sylla,
Emerging Financial Markets and Early U.S. Growth 7 (Vanderbilt University, Dept. of
Economics, Working Paper No. 00-W15, May 2000), available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/
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Early corporations in the late eighteenth century, typically
chartered under special acts of incorporation by states for a limited pub-
lic purpose and granted with special privileges, paled in number to the
dominant forms of business at the time - partnerships and proprietor-
ships. However, the war debt amassed after the American Revolution
would soon force the country to choose an economic model that would
lead to the rise of great corporations and transform the nation into a
"commercial empire." This model, proposed by the first Secretary of
the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, would defeat a competing vision
offered by another great Founder, Thomas Jefferson, who had a deep
distrust of commercial society. Hamilton's model, patterned after the
British experience, called for the assumption and monetization of state
war debts, the establishment of a national bank, and the promotion of
trade and credit.
Although initially feared, the nation would rapidly embrace Hamil-
ton's ideals. The expansion of industry and development of new tech-
nologies, particularly railroads, would require massive amounts of
capital that the partnership form simply could not provide. Moreover,
partnerships had several disadvantages - unlimited liability, the poten-
tial for hold-up, and imperfect monitoring - that could only be cured
by the adoption of the corporate form. Investors, formerly active owners
in small partnerships, would place their trust in the self-regulation poli-
cies of anonymous capital markets (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange)
and investment banking firms (e.g., J. P. Morgan & Co.) to become dis-
persed, passive shareholders in large railroad corporations. In turn, rail-
roads would widely open markets, spur urbanization, and lead to the
growth of wealth and capital in other industries. 7 Furthermore, railroads
would mandate a change to plutocratic systems of shareholder voting
and promote the development of sophisticated hierarchies of corporate
management and oversight.
The next section begins the story in late eighteenth century, pre-
industrial America. The Federalist economic program that laid the foun-
dation for a finance-led economic revolution follows. The Article then
turns to the role of banks and securities markets. Partnerships and busi-
ness corporations before the advent of railroads set the stage for the
plutocratic form of governance. The sections following show how rail-
Econ/wparchive/workpaper/vuOO-wl5.pdf, and Peter L. Rousseau, Historical Perspectives on
Financial Development and Economic Growth, 85 FED. RES. BANK ST. L. REv. 81, 92 (July/Aug.
2003), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/03/07/Rousseau.pdf (arguing
that limited liability for American banking corporations was critical in the development of banks
and capital markets).
7. This results in the separation of ownership and management detailed by BERLE & MEANS,
supra note 4, at 6.
20041
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roads mandated the plutocratic model. The Boston & Albany and Erie
roads demonstrated the need for modem management structures and
massive amounts of capital - dictating the success of the plutocratic
model. The Article concludes with an exposition of how capital markets
addressed the hold-up and monitoring problems associated with busi-
nesses. It shows how investment bankers like Morgan and the New
York Stock Exchange guarded the public interest and provided essential
liquidity, only available in plutocratic corporations.
II. LATE 18TH CENTURY, PRE-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA
In the late eighteenth century, America was in a pre-industrial stage
and businesses were really local businesses. The vast majority were
conducted as partnerships and proprietorships.8 Most of the economic
activity and market exchanges were local as well as the American conti-
nent had primitive transportation. The necessity of better transportation
would create the demand for "public works" projects like turnpikes,
canals, etc. - most built by the earliest corporations chartered under
special acts by state legislatures.9 While there was some coastal trade
between states and oceanic trade with Europe and the West Indies, prim-
itive networks of roads did not encourage trade or the development of
businesses of any magnitude.
Roughly six percent of the nation's five million people resided in
urban areas in 1800. Sixty percent lived in towns of less than 25,000.0
A comparison of population data from the late nineteenth century to
these figures underscores the development of "urbanization" along with
major industries. By 1900, the U.S. had a population of over 76 million,
with 39.6% of people living in urban areas."
Households were the predominant economic unit and they func-
tioned in a hierarchical manner. The father controlled production, repre-
sented the family's interests to the outside world, and organized the
economic activity,' 2 which replicated the rural experience within small
8. Today, the bulk of American businesses are small businesses and about 75% are still
partnerships and proprietorships. ROBERT HEILBRONER & LESTER THUROW, ECONOMICS
EXPLAINED 45 (1998).
9. Joseph S. Davis, Charters for American Business Corporations in the Eighteenth Century,
15 PUB. AM. STAT. Ass'N 426, 429 (1916). For one of the best general accounts of late eighteenth
century American corporate development, see 2 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE
EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS (1917).
10. Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of
American Business History 12 (NBER Working Paper No. w9029, July 2002), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w9029.
II. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION: 1900-1990, available
at http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/urpop0090.txt.
12. Lamoreaux, supra note 10, at 12.
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stores and shops. The husband was in charge, but his wife was fre-
quently his second in command. Production within shops and stores was
along gender lines for division of labor. Journeymen, apprentices, and
other employees often lived with the family and were subject to the dis-
cipline of the master of the household, similar to his family.' 3
Thus, late in the eighteenth century and into the beginning of the
nineteenth century, much of America's economic activity centered on
the home and small businesses that replicated the management functions
of subsistence farms. However, the new nation would soon be on the
verge of economic change as it attempted to place itself on a strong
economic footing.
With victory in the American Revolution, the nation came to a fork
in the road. There were two economic models offered by two titans of
the first cabinet: the Jeffersonian model of agrarian democracy and yeo-
man farmers (which was really an anti-commercial, anti-industrial
model) 4 and the Hamiltonian commercial empire. America has never
lost sight of these two paradigms. The Hamiltonian-Jeffersonian con-
flict continues to play out in American politics, but from the standpoint
of the markets, Hamilton was triumphant. His commercial model laid
the foundation for America as a capitalistic nation.
Whether one likes Jefferson or not, his model, while in many
instances status based, is also very personal and comforting. There were
good reasons for the farmers throughout the United States to dread the
Hamiltonian model. Farmers and small merchants feared a loss of con-
trol. This loss was experienced when their products reached the com-
modity markets in the big cities of Boston or Philadelphia or Baltimore.
Anonymous markets and speculators could prey upon rural merchants
and farmers. No one's status protected him or his family from the vicis-
situdes of these markets. Jeffersonian concerns still retain their appeal
today. People fret about the forces of global capital markets and their
influences on their lives. However, despite such discomfiture and wor-
ries (similar to those articulated by America's early forebears who
opposed Hamilton and his economic plans), Hamilton won. His
approach to capital formation and the national debt led to the concentra-
tion of wealth in capital markets and larger businesses. The next section
takes up the story of how Hamilton's financial plans helped to establish
13. Id. at 12-14.
14. "Jeffersonian thought was motivated by an agrarian ideology. Jefferson envisioned the
United States as a nation of farmers, 'those who labour in the earth.' He feared that
manufacturing subsidies and bounties would drain the farm economy and encourage development
of a privileged class of the kind that accounted for so many of England's problems." Hovenkamp,
supra note 1, at 1610-11.
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robust capital markets and set the nation on the road to becoming a com-
mercial empire.
III. THE FEDERALIST ECONOMIC PROGRAM: FOUNDATION FOR A
FINANCE-LED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION?
The Federalist economic program of Alexander Hamilton and the
nascent American banking system (discussed infra) seems to have pro-
vided the framework for a finance-led economic transformation of the
American continent. "By any standards, the U.S. economy experienced
a near-miraculous turnaround in the last decade of the 18th century,
when it made the transition from a defaulting debtor awash in obliga-
tions left over from the war of independence to a magnet for interna-
tional capital flows."15 However, the results and the success of
Hamilton's plans were not pre-ordained.
America, at the conclusion of the War for Independence, was a
weak debtor nation. It owed $2 million to Dutch banking houses and
about $5 million to the French. 16 In 1786, the total income of the central
government was less than one-third of the charges owed the national
debt.' 7 The situation under the Articles of Confederation worsened.
The Confederation was burdened with huge debts because it lacked taxa-
tion powers; hence, it could neither pay, nor service the debt. Debt
instruments traded for a fraction of their face value in illiquid and unor-
ganized capital markets.'" The simple financial intermediation system
was comprised of just three banks: one in Philadelphia, one in Boston,
and one in New York. 9 America's money supply consisted of foreign
coin and specie, fiat paper money from the states as well as local notes,
and deposits from the three banks.2" Speculators bought up debt from
soldiers and suppliers to the army. There was widespread concern that
the United States would default on the debt owed to its foreign support-
ers and its own citizens. The Constitution created a new republic, with
powers sufficient to build a strong nation if they were prudently wielded.
By 1790, Washington's government faced a federal war debt owed to
American citizens of approximately $40 million ($27 million in princi-
pal, and $13 million in interest arrears). The total war debt, federal,
state and foreign, was a staggering $76 million.2'
15. Rousseau, supra note 6, at 92.
16. See STUART BRUCHEY, ENTERPRISE: THE DYNAMIC ECONOMY OF A FREE PEOPLE 118
(1990) (All dollars are nominal and have not been adjusted for today's value).
17. Id. at 118.
18. Rousseau & Sylla, supra note 6, at 5.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. The total war debt was about $76 million in 1790. See JOHN FERLtNG, A LEAP IN THE
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Hamilton became the architect of the nation's success. As the first
Secretary of the Treasury, he was armed with federal taxation powers to
create a system of sound revenue finance. Hamilton understood that he
had to overcome the states' reluctance to tax themselves to fund the
nation's debt. He wanted to minimize conflicts "over available sources
of revenue because he wished above all to minimize political challenge
to the Constitutional settlement."22 Hamilton's idea was to convert the
states' debts to a national debt (assumption of the debt) and fund the
repayment out of federal taxes that only indirectly touched upon the peo-
ple - imposts on higher priced imported goods and excise taxes.2 3 This
scheme removed the prickly matter from the province of the states and
local politics, strengthened the federal government, and established a
good course for the economy. Further, when the plan proved to be suc-
cessful by strengthening the economy, federal revenues rose, making the
assumption and repayment scheme even sounder.
Hamilton, the astute student of finance that he was, borrowed much
of his program from Britain's successful management of its national
debt. By 1790, the British debt stood at £272 million. It had steadily
increased from £16.7 million in 1700, to £131 million in 1763 (the end
of the Seven Years' War), to £245 million after the American Revolu-
tion.24 Yet, tiny England prospered and controlled a huge global empire.
The financial secret was that the Bank of England had modernized reve-
nue collection and successfully monetized the debt by permitting the
bonds to be used by merchants and others as collateral for loans.
25
Hence, bankers and other financial capitalists increased the money sup-
ply by granting loans to debtors possessing this very secure collateral. If
the loans went for business purposes, the commercial capital of the
nation increased. This was a great "twofer." Great Britain funded its
DARK: THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 316 (2003). The federal government
owed about $40 million to Americans. See WILLIAM G. ANDERSON, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY: THE
PUBLIC DEBT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 41 (1983). The federal government also owed
$11.7 million in foreign debt. Id. at 57. States owed $25 million in war debt. Id. at 35.
To put things in modem perspective, the 1790 war debt was two to three times national
income. It might be thought of as a $20-30 trillion national debt against our $11 trillion income in
2003! (Our present debt, large as it seems, is somewhat more that $6 trillion.) I derived this by
making some calculations. Bruchey thought the GNP to be between 10-15 percent of American
exports. BRUCHEY, supra note 16, at 382-83. Since our exports were approximately $2.4 million,
the GNP must have been between $27 million and $41 million. (Calculations on file with author.)
Hence the total war debt was two to three times GNP!
22. BRUCHEY, supra note 16, at 120.
23. Id.
24. JOHN STEELE GORDON, HAMILTON'S BLESSING: THE EXTRAORDINARY LIFE AND TIMES OF
OUR NATIONAL DEBT 2-3 (1997). All sums are nominal and have not been adjusted for inflation.
25. The British national debt was funded by long-term bonds (and some not maturing called
Consuls) that were traded in the marketplace. Id. at 4.
2004]
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war debts and other public purposes at the same time. The commercial
community built up trade and later, industry. Thus, the debt was lique-
fied. This monetization permitted funds to flow smoothly to where they
were needed for commerce and industry.26
Britain's plan was an elegant recipe for success. As Secretary of
the Treasury, Hamilton was smart enough to copy it and eloquent
enough to convince Americans to adopt it. He knew that the United
States required sound money and market liquidity. An unpopular (but
necessary) step was to honor all Revolutionary War debt. This was
unpopular because speculators had purchased the debt cheap from
soldiers, farmers, small investors, etc. The honoring of the debt would
prove to be a windfall to those opportunists and speculators. Nonethe-
less, the federal government had to prove it would not capriciously
choose which debts to pay, thereby establishing sound national credit for
the infant republic.
Hamilton's economic plans in his Report on the First United States
Bank27 and Report on Manufactures28 called for a bold, federalist gov-
ernment that sanctioned commercial enterprise and industrial develop-
ment.2 9 This mercantile development needed solid capital markets and
federal revenue and monetary policies to stimulate growth in the new
republic. Ultimately, the markets created would come to be dominated
by industrialists.3" Hamilton would sanction the large capital pools that
efficiently allocate scarce financial resources among competing entre-
preneurs and businesses. He would not be afraid of commercial domi-
nance; rather, he would welcome it.
Indeed, Hamilton's economic programs - the establishment of the
First United States Bank, the refunding of the American Revolutionary
War debt, the stimulation of trade and credit - were devised to create a
commercial empire.3 They also had the effect of favoring the trading
26. Id. at 1-4.
27. Report on a National Bank (Dec. 13, 1790) [hereinafter Report on a National Bank], in
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: WRITINGS 575-612 (Joanne B. Freeman ed., 2001) [hereinafter
HAMILTON: WRITINGS].
28. Report on the Subject of Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791) [hereinafter Report on
Manufactures], in HAMILTON: WRITINGS, supra note 27, at 647-734.
29. Recent studies have supported a "finance-led" growth in the United States. Innovative
capital markets providing both debt and equity financing to emerging businesses and technologies
were central to growth and modernization. Rousseau & Sylla, supra note 6. See also Rousseau,
supra note 6.
30. Initially, they were merchants, mill owners, toll road and canal builders, and railroad
entrepreneurs. Later in the nineteenth century, oil, steel, sugar, and mining magnates were
financed. All have followed the Hamiltonian commercial path.
31. For an entertaining piece on the relationship between Hamilton and Wall Street, see
Howard M. Wachtel, Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of Wall Street (Economics Working
Paper Archive at WUSTL, Economic History Series, 1996), available at http://netec.mcc.ac.uk/
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and industrializing Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States over the agrarian
interests of the South and West. In brief, Hamilton's policies preferred
capitalists, merchants, and creditors over farmers, small town interests,
and debtors. They established a firm foundation for national credit and
jump-started the commercial society the United States enjoys today.
As noted, there was great opposition to Hamilton's plans.32 Some
of it was from the states, such as Virginia, that had already repaid much
or all of their debt. Virginians looked at the assumption plan as a wind-
fall for states that had not honored their obligations. Further, Virginians
were unhappy that some of the funds to repay the debt would find their
way into the hands of English and Scottish merchants, who were often
creditors of Virginia tobacco planters (and often despised on that
account). There was also opposition from small farmers and soldiers
who had sold their bonds at a deep discount to urban merchants.
Hamilton's cast of mind was instinctively economic. He visual-
ized the concentration of capital in the hands of a select few as the
essential pre-condition for commercial investment and economic
growth. One of the reasons he did not mind if original holders of
government securities sold out to speculators was that he preferred to
see the money in fewer hands. When money was spread out, it was
only money. When concentrated, it was capital. And the main rea-
son he welcomed the enlargement of the federal debt produced by
assuming the state debts was that, once properly funded, it enlarged
the pool of government credit for investment purposes by the wealthy
few who held the notes. In this limited sense at least, Hamilton
regarded the national debt as "a national blessing," for it permitted
the clustering of resources in the hands of a small group of enterpris-
ing men who would invest and not just spend it. For Madison, on the
other hand, "a Public Debt is a Public curse," and "in a Representa-
tive Government greater than in any other."33
Hamilton was right on point with respect to the short-term effects
from consolidation of the debt and its refunding, which led to the con-
centration of capital. However, that great capital pool eventually
expanded and became democratized as American capital markets devel-
oped and flourished over the next two centuries.
Hamilton's plan was fortuitously enacted by Congress. Although,
WoPEc/data/Papers/wpawuwpeh9610001 .html. For Hamilton's career as Treasury Secretary, see
RICHARD BROOKHISER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: AMERICAN 75-128 (1999).
32. Hamilton's plan for the assumption of the debt is found in his First Report on Public
Credit. See Report on the Public Credit (Jan. 9, 1790), in HAMILTON: WRITINGS, supra note 27, at
531-74.
33. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 64, citing
Madison to Lee, 13 April 1790, ROBERT A. RUTLAND, ET AL., 22 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
147-48 (1962).
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the deal was actually struck at one of the most successful dinner parties
in American politics.34 Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of State and
Hamilton's opponent, hosted a dinner party in the summer of 1790 for
Hamilton, James Madison (another opponent of Hamilton), and himself.
The dinner conversation laid the groundwork for a great compromise -
the South was to be the site of the new U.S. capital (hence, the creation
of the District of Columbia as the Federal City) in exchange for the
South's support for Hamilton's plans. Madison and Jefferson advanced
Southern interests by wresting the capital from the corrupt influences of
northern cities, commerce, and industry. In return, they would rally
the South behind the assumption plan. Pennsylvania acceded to the deal
and supported it because the federal capital was to be moved from New
York City to Philadelphia for ten years prior to its move to the District
(Pennsylvania held out hope that after ten years in the hospitable climes
of Philadelphia, the plan to move the capital south would be aban-
doned). 36 Hamilton got the better of the deal and the assumption of the
debt put America and its economy on a strong footing.
The American debt was also monetized, following the Bank of
England model. 37 The new federal debt was known as "Hamilton 6s"
(because of the interest rate). 38 The Hamilton 6s were redeemable at
par, like consuls. They were extremely popular and very quickly estab-
lished their value, regularly trading above par (indicating the strength of
the investment).39 Monetization accomplished two important goals: it
provided necessary funds to operate the government and greatly
increased the liquidity of the economy (and that attracted more capi-
tal).4 ° Finally, historian Richard Hildreth has neatly summarized the
long-term effects of the Hamiltonian policies:
The great secret of the beneficial operation of the funding sys-
tem was the reestablishment of confidence; for commercial confi-
34. The dinner bargain described here is the "traditional account" of the event. However, the
exact details of the dinner, as well as its overall importance, have been hotly contested. Cf Jacob
E. Cooke, The Compromise of 1790, 27 WILL. & MARY Q. 523 (1970) and Kenneth R. Bowling,
Dinner at Jefferson's: A Note on Jacob E. Cooke's "The Compromise of 1790", 28 WILL. &
MARY QUART. 629 (1971).
35. GORDON, supra note 24, at 30.
36. See The Dinner, in ELLIS, supra note 33, at 48-80. The White House was probably
located at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue to compensate the Commonwealth for its great loss.
37. While the American public debt system resembled England's, the federal fiscal system
bore close resemblances to that of the Dutch. See NIALL FERGUSON, THE CASH NEXUS: MONEY
AND POWER IN THE MODERN WORLD, 1700-2000, at 115 (2001).
38. Id.
39. See Rousseau & Sylla, supra note 6, at 6, and GORDON, supra note 24, at 38-39 (by 1794,
the United States had the highest credit rating in Europe and some of its bonds were selling at ten
percent over par!).
40. GORDON, supra note 24, at 11-41.
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dence, though political economists may have omitted to enumerate it
among the elements of production, is just as much one of those ele-
ments as labor, land, or capital-a due infusion of it increasing in a
most remarkable degree the productive activity of those other ele-
ments, and the want of it paralyzing their power to a corresponding
extent. By restoration of confidence in the nation, confidence in the
states, and confidence in individuals, the funding system actually
added to the labor, land, and capital of the country a much greater
value than the amount of debt thereby charged upon them.41
Thus, Hamilton correctly reported that the government's monetary
policies were necessary to attract both domestic and foreign capital.42
He accurately foresaw that America would need to import European
capital. 43 Hamilton presaged what happened in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries as America's sound monetary policies and investment
opportunities attracted foreign capital to build, sustain, and expand a
continental economy.4 4
IV. THE EARLY ROLE OF BANKS AND SECURITIES MARKETS
4 5
The nation had restructured its large war debt within five years of
the ratification of the Constitution. It had introduced the dollar as cur-
rency and created a national banking system. This banking structure
linked securities markets and gained the confidence of many European
investors.4 6 By the 1840s, state governments had chartered more than
800 banks and securities markets grew, providing short and long-term
debt, as well as equity, to finance new technologies and governmental
41. Richard Hildreth, THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Vol. I, at 276
(1856), quoted in BRUCHEY, supra note 16, at 129.
42. The aid of foreign Capital may safely, and with considerable latitude be taken into
calculation. Its instrumentality has been long experienced in our external commerce; and it has
begun to be felt in various other modes. Not only our funds, but our Agriculture and other internal
improvements have been animated by it. It has already in a few instances extended even to our
manufactures.
It is a well-known fact, that there are parts of Europe, which have more Capital, than
profitable domestic objects of employment. Hence, among other proofs, the large loans
continually furnished to foreign states. And it is equally certain that the capital of other parts may
find more profitable employment in the United States, than at home. And notwithstanding there
are weighty inducements to prefer the employment of capital at home even at less profit, to an
investment of it abroad, though with greater gain, yet these inducements are overruled either by a
deficiency of employment or by a very material difference in profit. Both these Causes operate to
produce a transfer of foreign capital to the United States. Report on Manufactures, supra note 28,
at 677-78.
43. Id.
44. "By 1801 Europeans held $33 million in U.S. securities, and European capital was
helping mightily to build the American economy." GORDON, supra note 24, at 39.
45. Sommer's article contains detailed information on the development of American banks.
Sommer, supra note 1.
46. Rousseau & Sylla, supra note 6, at 2.
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operations.47 Within two years of the refunding legislation, trading was
so great in federal and state securities that brokers formed an exchange
that was to become the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Within 100
years, the NYSE would eclipse London's as the greatest exchange in the
world.48 As evidenced in the following section, the monitoring function
of the NYSE and of the great investment banks provided a proxy for
control that induced domestic and foreign investors to flood the United
States with capital in the nineteenth century.
While there were only three banks in 1789, 28 banks were
chartered in the 1790s. In the next decade, 73 more were chartered.
They were quite profitable and often yielded eight percent on invested
capital. By 1825, it is estimated that English equity was not signifi-
cantly greater than U.S. bank equity (the Bank of the United States and
state-chartered banks) of $138 million.4 9 Therefore, the English and
American capital markets were about the same size by the mid-1820s,
even though the English had a century's lead time. The fact that the
U.S. had the same amount of capitalization with fewer listed firms sup-
ports the inference that the U.S. was more heavily capitalized. This was
a consequence of its lead in chartering banking corporations with limited
liability. While both capital markets listed utilities and transportation,
insurance, and manufacturing companies, the big difference was in bank
capital. America had a lot of it to lend due to its liberal chartering poli-
cies.50 There were 834 banks by 1840 and by 1860 the number had
nearly doubled again. Bank capital increased from $3 million in 1790 to
$426 million in 1840."' Both the Bank of the United States and state
banks were corporations that had limited liability, probably aiding in
their success and expansion.
While the United States did not invent the bank corporation, the
American approach was quite different from the privileged monopolies
of other banks such as the Bank of England. American charters did not
grant monopoly privileges. As a result, American banks and businesses
thrived in the atmosphere of competition. Only in the mid-nineteenth
century did European nations begin to create competitive banks.52
It is a stylized fact ... that England was the financial leader of
the nineteenth century. The pound sterling the world's leading cur-
rency, London and the Bank of England the center of the world's
finances, and the London capital market intermediated the intema-
47. Id.
48. GORDON, supra note 24, at 39.
49. Rousseau & Sylla, supra note 6, at 12.
50. Id. at 13.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id. at 7.
[Vol. 58:525
PARTNER TO PLUTOCRAT
tional flow of capital. Much less known is that as early as 1825, the
United States, with a population still smaller than that of England and
Wales (11.1 versus 12.9 million), had roughly 2.4 times the banking
capital of the latter .... This was not entirely the result of the U.S.
financial revolution. English policy, and in particular the monopoly
privileges of the Bank of England and the restriction of all other
banks to unlimited-liability partnerships of six or fewer people,
retarded banking development in that country until 1825, when the
policy was altered to allow joint-stock banking with unlimited
liability.53
American enterprise was also given a boost by the development of
securities markets. With the 1790 debt refinancing and the creation of
the Bank of the United States in 1791, securities markets arose in
America's four major cities: New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Balti-
more. These markets gave investors the opportunity to trade both debt
and equity issues. They also provided domestic and foreign investors
with liquidity, thereby giving them the courage to invest in the new
nation. The success of the markets is demonstrated by the fact that more
than half the federal debt and Bank of United States stock and more than
half of the listed securities were owned by Europeans.54 Thus, the early
securities markets, the Bank of the United States, and the competition of
state banks provided a growing pool of capital for businesses that
needed it. As corporations evolved and became engaged in larger enter-
prises, such as canal and rail networks, the capital markets would further
the growth of the economy. That expansion was coming and would
build on the capital markets; but, the nation was not there yet.
V. PARTNERSHIPS BEFORE THE ADVENT OF THE RAILROADS
Before railroads burst on the scene and knitted the nation together,
creating national markets and gigantic businesses, nineteenth century
businesses were predominately proprietorships and partnerships with a
smattering of non-banking corporations. Business size was limited as
the size of markets (without railroads or canals) was also limited. The
availability of capital was restricted as proprietors and partners relied on
their personal credit and that of friends and neighbors.
Partnerships were relatively small businesses that were owned and
controlled by a small number of people. The partners had intensely per-
sonal relationships with their employees, community, creditors, and their
product. Actually, if one thinks about the law of partnership, the part-
ners were the business. There was a certain transparency in that, if one
53. Id. at 7-8.
54. Id. at 8-9.
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was a partner, he was the business. His credit was the business's credit;
his botched, defective, or dangerous product was his liability. There
really was no separation of interest at that particular time. There are
probably very good moral and philosophical reasons for that. The inti-
mate local control gave the people most closely affected by the products
or services of partnerships power and recourse if something went wrong.
The community also possessed the ability to distinguish between good
purveyors of a service and bad purveyors. The drawback, of course, was
unlimited liability, which hampered credit and the ability to expand.
Partnerships had another drawback as well - they typically terminated
upon the death, retirement, or withdrawal of partners.
Partnerships were frequently chosen for business operations
because they "reduced particular classes of transaction costs, mitigated
certain types of opportunism, facilitated monitoring, or promoted certain
types of direction-taking and giving."55 Also, partnerships were more
likely to be used in occupations where individuals were "involved in
complex, team-oriented tasks where attributing output to specific indi-
viduals is difficult."56 However, if some members of the firm were
clearly more productive than others, an equal sharing scheme would
result in the more productive partners subsidizing the less productive
ones. Therefore, partners had an incentive to select individuals with
similar levels of experience and productivity.57 This obviated the need
to engage in the traditional preceptor relationship.
In addition, partnerships gave the partners a sense of ownership and
control. Indeed, the common default was that all partners managed the
business and shared the profits of the enterprise. This was all beneficial,
but partnerships had another major disadvantage - hold-ups by part-
ners, business suppliers, and creditors.58 Since creditors and suppliers
were not members of the firm, the partnership had to contract with these
important persons to protect its livelihood. Imperfect contracts empow-
ered creditors and suppliers to "extort" rents from the productive part-
nership. On the other hand, the modem corporation, with its access to
large pools of capital, has the ability to capture these resources through
horizontal and vertical integration, eliminating some of these hold-up
opportunities.5 9
Hold-ups occurred because, under partnership law of the nineteenth
55. Howard Bodenhom, Partnership and Hold-Up in Early America 16 (NBER Working
Paper No. w8814, Mar. 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8814.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 18-22.
58. Id. at 8-9.
59. In more modem times, the conglomerate corporation of the 1960s was able to use its
market power and access to credit and markets to hinder hold-ups.
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and most of the twentieth centuries, partners could threaten the firm's
existence by withdrawing or threatening to withdraw. Bodenhorn found
that partners were sometimes forced to accept disadvantageous terms
after they had invested because the partnership relation or specific sunk
assets exposed the partners to the opportunistic behavior of their co-
investors.60 The fear of hold-up can lead to "inefficiently low levels of
investment."6 Moreover, hold-ups can occur at any time, "from initial
negotiations in forming a partnership to one partner threatening prema-
ture liquidation if the other refuses to concede a portion of his or her
share of the firm's profits."62 Ultimately, the combination of "asset
specificity" 63 and "imperfect contracts"'  will establish the greatest
potential for hold-ups.65
Partnerships persist as a prevalent business form because they have
certain value for specific economic activities. Partnerships are most val-
uable and desirable in human-capital intensive industries where it is dif-
ficult to observe product quality. This explains the concentration of
partnerships in professional service industries such as accounting, law,
medicine, investment banking, engineering, architecture, etc. 66 Partner-
ships are generally not found in large businesses where the monitoring
of products or services can be quantified by scientific management prac-
tices. 67  Hence, the virtue of partnerships in professional services and
other such businesses becomes a drawback when great businesses must
be constructed and other methods of monitoring must be employed.
60. Bodenhorn, supra note 55, at 7.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 8.
63. Four types of asset specificity include: site specificity; physical asset specificity; human
asset specificity; and dedicated assets. See Oliver E. Williamson, 1982 Merger Guidelines:
Vertical Merger Guidelines: Interpreting the 1982 Reforms, 71 CALi. L. REv. 604, 613-614
(1983).
64. The more complex the transaction, the more likely possible contingencies will not be
realized. These unforeseen contingencies could create problems of hold-up after the partnership is
formed if partners are not able to reach agreement. For example, if one partner has leverage over
the others, he could force them to give into his terms or face dissolution of the partnership.
65. Recent studies of corporate governance recognize that stakeholders other than
shareholders (i.e., suppliers, customers, neighbors and employees) make investments specific to
their relationship with a firm. . . . At the same time, the firm may undertake specific investments
to attract and accommodate emnlnvees neighbor, spers, -nd eustomers. In the abscncc 3f
complete contracts, one party can threaten to terminate the relationship and destroy the value of
the sunk asset as a bargaining ploy to capture a greater share of the gains from the trade. This is
the essence of hold-up ....
Bodenhorn, supra note 55, at 8-9.
66. Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, A Theory of Partnerships at Abstract (SIEPR
Discussion Paper No. 0 1-36, Oct. 2002), available at http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?abstractid=
311159.
67. See infra sections on the modern management structures and techniques pioneered by
American railroads.
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"[I]f market monitoring is sufficiently reliable, corporations perform
better than partnerships, while if market monitoring is weak, partner-
ships are strictly more profitable than corporations."68
As a result, partnerships, while a natural form of business and one
easily adopted, had significant drawbacks related to fragility, hold-ups,
and unlimited liability. Large businesses were difficult to construct as a
partnership due to liability, monitoring concerns, and the need for capital
and liquidity. The hold-up problem and the difficulties entailed in liqui-
dating partnership interests thus depressed the value of partnership
investments. This devaluation limited partnership credit, growth, and
the size of the business enterprise. The modern business corporation
solved many of the problems inherent in partnership enterprises and
gave rise to the creation of enormous businesses when investors were
able to surrender their need for control, monitoring, ownership, and
other partnership attributes and were willing to trust the capital markets
for their investment security.
The history of the Corliss steam engine is instructive of how the
newly-fashioned corporate form frustrated hold-up. While first organ-
ized as a partnership in 1847, the venture was reorganized as a corpora-
tion in 1857. George Corliss and Nightingale, an investor, owned the
bulk of the stock. When Corliss sought to have the firm issue more
stock to his brother (thereby giving George effective control of the com-
pany), Nightingale refused to reduce his holdings and blocked other
efforts that would have rendered him a minority owner. Had the com-
pany been a partnership, George could have dissolved the venture quite
easily. As it was, George ultimately prevailed because he retained per-
sonal control of the patents.6 9 Nevertheless, the Corliss tale demon-
strates that corporate investors have greater protection against hold-ups
and helps to explain why corporations became such an important
institution.
VI. BUSINESS CORPORATIONS BEFORE THE ADVENT OF RAILROADS
"The business corporation was the unique creation of American
lawmakers during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
made by state legislatures that chartered corporations, the state courts
that created a body of decisional law for their internal governance, and
the Supreme Court that defined the institution by establishing its rela-
tionship to the states. What these lawmaking institutions discovered was
that the corporate form, used in England and the colonies to organize
charitable and public institutions, could be refashioned to suit the special
68. Levin & Tadelis, supra note 66, at 2.
69. Lamoreaux, supra note 6, at 69.
[Vol. 58:525
PARTNER TO PLUTOCRAT
needs of American entrepreneurs. New production technology, espe-
cially in textiles, required large capital investment. In a country where
the government did not regularly finance production ventures, stock
ownership made imminent sense, especially when it was accompanied
by centralized management, a key feature of corporate form. Armed
with immortality by its charter, unlike the earlier joint-stock companies
organized for a single venture, as well as limited liability, provided grad-
ually during this period of legislative enactment, the corporation was an
increasingly attractive investment vehicle for entrepreneurs, provided
that the investment could be secured against state regulation."7
And Dartmouth College7 did just that! The Supreme Court used
the "contract clause" of the Constitution 72 to protect Dartmouth College
from the New Hampshire Republican legislature.73 The Court protected
American business corporations from meddlesome and undue interfer-
ence when it held that corporate charters were contracts and not
franchises or concessions that could be altered at the caprice of legisla-
tors.74 To radically simplify the distinction: if the charter is a contract
between the incorporators and the state, then the contract clause forbids
states from altering the terms of the contract. To do otherwise would
frustrate the moral intent of the original parties and cripple the formation
of capital. On the other hand, if the charter is a franchise or concession
from the state (as was sometimes the practice with the Crown), then the
sovereign could, in the exercise of its powers, amend the basic structure
as it saw fit, limited only by the constitutional restrictions placed upon
legislation and the representatives' sense of fairness and equity. Under
the franchise theory, capital-raising efforts would be shaky indeed!
Dartmouth College confirmed that these artificial creatures could
only exist through state charters. "Story's concurrence ...permitted
70. R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 246-
247 (2001).
71. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). R. KENT MEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH
STORY: A STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 129-135 (1985).
72. U.S. CONST. art I., § 10, cl. 1.
73. The Jeffersonian opposition to aristocratic privilege is one of the political undercurrents
of the legislation that set up the litigation.
74. There was no doubt in Marshall's mind that the Contract Clause "must be
understood as intended to guard against a power of at least doubtful utility, the
abuse of which had been extensively felt; and to restrain the legislature in the future
from violating the right to property." [Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 628.] If any
authority for the interpretation was needed, he found it in the history of the states
under the Articles of Confederation. The law according to Marshall was that
corporate property was identical to private property, that the legal character of the
corporation might be inferred from rights belonging to individual stockholders.
NEWMYER, supra note 70, at 251.
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states to impose explicit regulations in corporate charters. 75 Theoreti-
cally, a state could reserve the power to make fundamental changes.
However, such a reservation seems to be limited by both contract doc-
trine (illusory contracts) and constitutional notions of due process and
equal protection. Hence, Dartmouth College served as a substantial
restraint upon arbitrary state power directed at business enterprises. 76
Legislatures regularly attempted to curb the wealth and power of
corporations.7 7 However, the need for capital and the shift in public
attitude away from suspicion of corporations to enthusiasm led to a
relaxation of state regulation in the nineteenth century. 78 Legislatures
removed restrictions or relaxed them to further the interests of emerging
large corporations.79 Corporations now possessed the power and legal
theory to capture even more power and wealth. Yet, the Jeffersonian
distrust of commerce remained. The Jacksonian objections to "special
privileges" and popular support for industrialization persisted,8" as they
do to this day. Nevertheless, with the rise of general incorporation laws
(1840-1850s), the foundation was laid for the rise of Big Business,
which would rely on the vibrant and emerging capital markets. These
critical legal developments spanned the first half of the nineteenth
century.
Corporations also spurred industrialization and urbanization. In the
first half of the nineteenth century, America was largely agricultural; in
1850, 64 percent of workers were in agricultural occupations.8 Manu-
75. Id. at 222. The reservation of powers doctrine permits states to modify the business
organization laws to accommodate future, unforeseen needs.
76. For the remainder of the nineteenth century, the college decision was a potent legal
and ideological weapon for corporations who sought to defeat regulation and
establish the ideological primacy of laissez-faire capitalism. In the process, the
business corporation came to be seen as just another enterprising individual, the
personification in law of the individual stockholders who composed it. As such, it
was made the beneficiary of the Anglo-American legal tradition, which equated
property rights with individual liberty. In America, unlike England, the corporation
became both the instrument and the chief cultural symbol of economic
modernization.
Id. at 247 (citing E. MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860; wrin-
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MASSACHUSETTS 11 (1954)).
77. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-56 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in
part) (discussing various state restrictions upon corporations).
78. Kelvin H. Dickinson, Partners in a Corporate Cloak: The Emergence and Legitimacy of
the Incorporated Partnership, 33 Am. U.L. REV. 559, 574 (1984). See also JAMES W. ELY, JR.,
RAILROADS & AMERICAN LAW 18-19 (Prior to the 1840s, special charters were granted by the
legislatures for railroads. The enactment of general railroad legislation signaled that free entry
was desirable. Henceforth, greater efficiencies prevailed and private ordering and economic
competition was the preference) (2001).
79. Dickinson, supra note 78.
80. ELY, supra note 78, at 16.
81. Nonetheless, manufacturing industries "were probably the most important in the United
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facturing was present in small firms. For instance, in 1832, only 106
manufacturers had assets greater than $100,000.82
In addition, the American rise of the corporation was quite different
than England's experience. For example, between 1783-1801, there
were 350 business corporations incorporated in the U.S.,8 3 yet from
1700-1800 in the United Kingdom, only about six business corporations
for manufacturing were incorporated, with few in other industries.
Handlin states:
Throughout the whole of the eighteenth century England
chartered some half-dozen corporations for manufacturing purposes,
and hardly more in any other business sphere. Until well into the
nineteenth century the corporation was used extensively only in the
organization of canal companies. Not until the Companies Act of
1844 did it become common, and full growth awaited the coming of
limited liability after 1855 and the enactment of the Consolidated
Statute of 1862.84
Before the national market was created by the railroad network,
many firms conducted their business in the partnership form. The
advantages of the corporate form were not as clear as they seem now.
Fixed capital for manufacturing ventures was not large. Entrepreneurs
could often raise funds from neighbors, friends, and family. Firm earn-
ings were also a good source of capital (with no income tax, partnerships
could retain earnings and reinvest, something that is rare in modem life
due to the biases of the tax code that encourage partnerships to distribute
profits). Corporations could raise more capital due to their advantages
of limited liability and continuity of life.85 However, technology had
not yet reached the point where economies of scale would be obtained
through large enterprises. Nor were there national markets to support
large businesses. As a result, manufacturers and other businesses con-
fronted shallow capital markets that contained high risk for ventures.
Stockholders often participated in the firm to maintain control and
ensure a distribution of profits.86 Indeed, some corporations may have
been limited in their search for capital because the limited liability
States at the time." William C. Kessler, A Statistical Study of the New York General
Incorporation Act of 1811, 48 J. POL. ECON. 877, 880 (1940).
82. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J. ECON. Lrr.
401, 413 (2003).
83. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 6, at 4.
84. Id. at 3.
85. Because corporations were also not subject to any income tax they could retain earnings
easily for expansion. The ability to lock in capital was critical. See Blair, supra note 5.
86. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Partnership Form of Organization: Its Popularity in Early-
Nineteenth-Century Boston, in COLOSSUS: How THE CORPORATION CHANGED AMERICA 51-52
(Jack Beatty ed., 2000) [hereinafter CoLossus].
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enjoyed by investors took away further sources of collateral. 87
Without national markets and risky capital pools for their ventures,
businesses tended to stay close to home and remained small. Even
larger manufacturing enterprises like mills, etc. were dominated by the
family firm, even if the firm had several manufacturing sites. The fam-
ily management was close enough to the workers and subordinate super-
visors to effectively run these small enterprises without the need for
massive amounts of capital or a large number of investors. Conse-
quently, these businesses continued as family corporations with active
management by the family member shareholders. In effect, they con-
ducted business like incorporated partnerships.88
VII. THE EVOLUTION TO THE PLUTOCRATIC FORM OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 8 9
Nineteenth century firms used many forms of management to
attract capital and managers. British shareholders were called "members
of the firm." These investors relied on the common law rule of one vote
per investor to give owners considerable management power. In the
United States, and later in Britain and on the Continent, three models
developed: the common law model (one vote per investor, regardless of
capital); the prudent mean (proportionate voting90), and plutocratic vot-
ing (one vote per share, with the wealthiest investors purportedly domi-
nating the corporation).
The common law model of one adventurer/one vote remained the
predominant method of voting in early nineteenth century American cor-
porations. 9' This was usually the default rule so that if there were no
87. Id.
88. Traditionally merchants had used the bonds of kinship and friendship to cement far-flung
ventures. The formal organization structures characteristic of twentieth-century businesses were
then unknown. Before 1860, even the largest of manufacturing corporations had only one or two
factories, normally located in single place. Thus the manager of a cotton mill could view his
entire establishment in an hour or two and found no need for elaborate systems to supervise
subordinates. STEPHEN SALSBURY, THE STATE, THE INVESTOR, AND THE RAILROAD: THE BOSTON
& ALBANY, 1825-1867, at 299 (1967).
89. Many of the ideas in this section are based upon the paper by Colleen Dunlavy (Professor
of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison), Corporate Governance Structures and Their
Alternatives, presented at "The Corporation as a Social and Political Institution," Hagley Museum
& Library, Wilmington, Del. (Feb. 12-13, 2000). Professor Dunlavy has researched the structures
of early businesses in Europe and America and has published extensively. She has studied their
charters, read their resolutions and minute books, and unearthed the progression from common
law management to plutocratic governance, which she has viewed, in part, as a struggle between
democratic and anti-democratic impulses. (Notes on file with author.)
90. Some authors have referred to Hamilton's scheme as "regressive voting." Sommer, supra
note 1, at 1041.
91. This is, of course, the partnership default rule and is still the norm in partnerships today.
See Uniform Partnership Act § 18(e) (1914) and Uniform Partnership Act § 401(0 (1994). (In
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provisions in the charter, investors were considered as members of the
company or firm and had one vote regardless of actual capital invest-
ment. Thus, it was natural for the capital investor to accept that his
investment was equal to that of his neighbor, the service investor. There
was also considerable anti-plutocratic sentiment and a cultural and social
antipathy to domination by large shareholders and persons of wealth.92
Regardless, investors and large-scale ventures such as banks recog-
nized that the common law model would not necessarily do for many
businesses. A form, somewhat between plutocratic regimes and com-
mon law equality, was the "prudent mean."9 3 The prudent mean method
involved graduated voting scales94 and gave limited, but important,
power to large shareholders. The model is found in Alexander Hamil-
ton's Report on the First United States Bank (1790).95 The prudent
manager-run limited liability companies, the default is to the common law rule. See Uniform
Limited Liability Corporation Act § 404(b)(1) (1995)). It seems natural that new business forms
would have borrowed methods of control and organization from existing ones that were practical
and had a comfortable feel.
92. Americans were an independent bunch and loathed European power and privilege.
Remember that Anti-Federalists feared the centralization of political and economic power.
Jacksonians were the heirs of Jefferson and opposed FederalistlWhig institutions such as the
National Bank.
93. The prudent mean is alive and well today and can be found in classified stock and boards,
as well as investor contracts that give proportional voting and management rights. See Providence
& Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977) and Stroh v. Blackhawk Holding Corp., 272
N.E.2d 1 (I11. 1971).
94. Each shareholder is guaranteed at least one vote. Every investor owning at least the
minimum base of shares will receive one vote per share. If any investors own shares beyond this
level, they will receive additional votes in proportion to their level of ownership. For example, in
the Providence & Worcester case, the corporation's articles of incorporation provided that "each
stockholder shall be entitled to one vote for every share of the common stock of said company
owned by him not exceeding fifty shares, and one vote for every twenty shares more than fifty,
owned by him; provided, that no stockholder shall be entitled to vote upon more than one fourth
part of the whole number of shares issued and outstanding." Providence & Worcester Co. v.
Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 122 n.2 (Del. 1977).
95. A further consideration in favour of a change is the improper rule, by which the
right of voting for Directors is regulated in the plan, upon which the Bank of North
America was originally constituted, namely a vote for each share [plutocratic model
- ed.], and the want of a rule in the last charter; unless the silence of it, on that
point, may signify that every Stockholder is to have an equal and a single vote,
which would be a rule in a different extreme [common law model - ed.] not less
erroneous. It is of imnortance that a nile -hnild he. esnhlkhe, nn thic h-,- i i.c
one of those things, which ought not to be left to discretion; and it is consequently,
of equal importance, that the rule should be a proper one.
A vote for each share renders a combination, between a few principal
Stockholders, to monopolise the power and benefits of the Bank too easy. An equal
vote to each Stockholder, however great or small his interest in the institution,
allows not that degree of weight to large stockholders, which it is reasonable they
should have, and which perhaps their security and that of the bank require. A
prudent mean is to be preferred. A conviction of this has produced a bye-law of the
corporation of the bank of North America, which evidently aims at such a mean.
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mean model was useful in balancing the power of the money against the
wealthy and it was used in the charters of both the First and Second
United States Banks. Sommer has offered an alternative rationale for
the prudent mean: "Although this rationale can be read as providing for
community control of the merchants, it reads more logically as provid-
ing mercantile control of the directors. In theory, regressive voting
would ensure that the respectable merchants would collectively domi-
nate the bank, but would keep individual merchants (or factions) from
oppressing the rest."9 6
The common law and prudent mean models persisted until the mid-
nineteenth century in America, when the need for massive amounts of
capital and liquidity demands favored the plutocratic model.97 The push
toward the plutocratic model occurred during the first decades of the
1800s. In 1811, the New York incorporation law pertaining to manufac-
tures allowed plutocratic voting.98 However, because there was strong
opposition to plutocratic voting, constraints were placed on the power of
large shareholders. For example, in Taylor v. Griswold,99 New Jersey
upset a plutocratic voting scheme by holding that shareholders of the
subject company were only entitled to one vote each, not one vote per
share. Nevertheless, pressure persisted for plutocratic voting and in
1841, the New Jersey legislature enacted legislation which overruled
Taylor v. Griswold."° Between 1860 and 1870, general incorporation
statutes were the rule, and by 1896, the plutocratic norm was firmly
established.a0 Other states followed New Jersey's example for statutory
plutocratic voting. Delaware's first modern corporate statute in 1899
was nearly a verbatim copy of the New Jersey act. Delaware General
Report on a National Bank, supra note 27, at 598.
96. Sommer, supra note 1, at 1042.
97. As the national economy grew, America needed huge amounts of capital to build its
railroads and mills, finance the Civil War, and complete the settlement of North America. Interest
rates in American capital markets were higher than in Europe, indicating both the greater risk of
the ventures and the insatiable demand for capital. This resulted in equity investors demanding
greater control. To create a fluid capital market, management structures shifted from the common
law control model to plutocratic governance.
98. Act of 22 Mar. 1811, 3 N.Y. Stat. 726 (1863).
99. 14 N.J.L. 222, 237-238 (N.J. 1834).
100. 1841 N.J. Laws, 65th sess., 2 sit. 116. Prior to this legislation, New Jersey legislators
established the rules for the number of votes each shareholder was entitled to at the time the state
granted the charter. The default position was the common law rule, which was opposed by most
large investors. However, the most prevalent formula was one vote per shareowner. The 1841
legislation changed the default rule to the plutocratic form. JOHN W. CADMAN, JR., THE
CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY: BUSINESS AND POLITICS 1791-1875, at 307-08 (1949).
101. New Jersey's General Enabling Act (1896) was the prototype for modem enabling laws.
1896 N.J. Laws 185, §§ 36, 289, amended by 1926 N.J. Laws 318, §§ 11, 539 and 1929 N.J. Laws
335, §§ 2, 757 (presently codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 14A:5-10 (West 2000)).
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Corporation Law was instrumental in becoming the most influential
source of corporate law in the country.
This movement toward plutocratic voting reflected the tension
between democratic rights and the need to attract capital from large
investors. As businesses progressed from family and entrepreneurial
capitalism to shareholder capitalism, the plutocratic form became
necessary. 
0 2
VIII. RAILROADS MANDATE THE PLUTOCRATIC MODEL
While the railroads' insatiable need of capital dictated the
plutocratic model, dispersed shareholding was in evidence before rail-
roads were in ascendancy. The Boston Manufacturing Company of
1813 was the first important enterprise to be organized along plutocratic
lines with the modem separation of ownership from management.
Although quite small by modem standards, it had the characteristics of
late corporate giants. In 1830, no one held more than eight and one-half
percent of the stock. By 1850, there were 123 shareholders, the largest
owning eight and one-half percent. Management as a group only held
11 percent.
0 3
American railroads demanded massive amounts of capital and new
financing methods were required to build them. While construction was
cheaper than canals, their vast size and scope was beyond the funding
resources of families and individuals. 1°4
Canals, and later the railroads, conquered the distances of the conti-
nent.1 5 That conquest fueled America's industrial revolution and
unleashed demands for goods, services, and speed.° 6 With their expan-
sive networks, the management of railroads mandated a departure from
the common law and prudent mean models. The railroads, by linking
the urban areas to the hinterlands and knitting regions together, drasti-
cally reduced transportation costs, which in turn led to the growth of
large urban areas and gigantic industries to provide for America's bur-
geoning population.
The histories of the Boston & Albany Railroad, circa 1825-1867,
and the Erie Railroad demonstrate how the movement toward plutocratic
102. For more on the relationship between the plutocratic corporation and capital market
liquidity, see Christian C. Day, Investor Power & Liquidity: Corporations, Capital Markets and
the Industrialization of America, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 345 (2001).
103. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 10-11.
104. See JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE GREAT GAME: THE EMERGENCE OF WALL STREET AS A
WORLD POWER, 1653-2000, at 76 (1999).
105. See Jack Beatty, Toward Scale and Scope, in COLOSSUS, supra note 86, at 63.
106. Railroads had a profound influence on all aspects of American law and culture. See ELY,
supra note 78.
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control was a result of the immense capital needs of the projects, as well
as the need for sophisticated management that could effectively monitor
outputs over vast distances. The management revolution that resulted in
the modern, hierarchical organization transformed American business
and fit exactly within the confines of centralized management, directed
by elected boards of directors, who remained responsible to atomistic
shareholders through fiduciary duties. First, the Boston & Albany." °7
A. The Boston & Albany
Prior to the Boston & Worcester °8 charter, major public improve-
ments, such as the Erie Canal, the Pennsylvania system of internal
improvements, and the Ohio canals, were publicly-financed enterprises.
Even the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company had substantial govern-
ment backing. 0 9 The American Revolution had disrupted trading pat-
terns. Americans no longer clung to the seaboard. Port cities like New
York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore sought to maintain their com-
mercial importance with links to the developing hinterlands. New York
State built the Erie Canal; Baltimore, the B&O in 1827; Philadelphia,
canal improvements to Pittsburgh by 1834.110 With the completion of
the Erie Canal, New York State's population doubled from one million
to two million people (1810-1830)."' Internal improvements were the
crucial nineteenth century network that connected regions and developed
the national economy." 1
2
The Boston & Albany was representative of the switch from pre-
dominately public financing for internal improvements to major reliance
on private capital." 3 This movement to private financing created
greater diversification in the capital markets (by offering private securi-
ties to complement government bonds) and quickly led to the separation
of ownership from management in the great corporations, like the
railroads.
The Boston & Albany was created to funnel agricultural goods
from the west to Boston and preserve its position as a major commercial
center and port. When it was finished in 1842, it had a total capitaliza-
107. The railroads comprising the Boston & Albany will be referred to as the Boston &
Albany, the B&A, the Boston & Worcester, and the Western Road (the latter two were the
predecessors of the Boston & Albany rail network).
108. The Boston & Worcester was a component of the Boston & Albany.
109. ELY, supra note 78.
110. Id. at 1.
111. SALSBURY, supra note 88, at 2.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 80.
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tion of $9 million (two-thirds provided by the government). ' 14 State
support was necessitated because of the Panic of 1837, a national crisis
that crippled credit. While Massachusetts' private capital for the venture
was substantial, it was the political power of that private capital that
convinced the government to back the project. The B&A proved to be a
very good investment; it paid six percent returns within three years of
completion. ' 5
As the B&A was constructed, there was an ongoing debate about
the public nature of railroads, which were seen as corporations imbued
with a public purpose. There was also grave uncertainty. After Charles
River Bridge"6 limited the monopoly granted a toll bridge, many inves-
tors declined to invest in transportation ventures fearing the loss of their
capital. Still, western Massachusetts clamored for an extension of the
Boston & Worcester, while simultaneously opposing increased taxation
and pushing for private investment. Ultimately, railroad fever caused
the investing public to put aside their fear of monopolies and commer-
cial power." 7
To continue construction to the west, the Boston & Worcester
issued 10,000 shares at $100 par to bring in small investors. 1 8 Prior to
this issue, previous large projects like the Lowell and Springfield mills
sold shares at $1000 par (a substantial amount that limited investments
to the very wealthy and made them illiquid). These earlier industrial
projects were also governed by the prudent mean. ' 9
The B&A's construction broke away from that mold. B&A shares
were sold in subscriptions of $10 and $20 installments to small inves-
tors. The company's charter required annual reports to the General
Court and committees of the legislature to protect the public. To further
promote construction, promoters sold shares for as little as $1 down for
the first assessment, with subsequent assessments in installments of $20
or $30. 120 Thus, the B&A sought a very broad base of investors, which
resulted in widely dispersed holdings. B&A shares were soon dispersed
afar as a primitive secondary market developed. By 1835, New Yorkers
controlled 45% of all shares on the New York Stock Exchange. 12' The
promoters developed a rate structure that met the investors' needs. The
114. Id. at 32.
115. Id.
116. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
117. SALSBURY, supra note 88, at 81.
118. Id. at 81-82.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 96.
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
annual dividend was six percent. 2 2 By 1837, the road had already paid
two dividends of eight percent.' 23 The road was a stunning success.
Railroad construction continued unabated. The Western Road was
financed with a subscription of 2,800 shares. While there was wide-
scale distribution, many held less than ten shares; yet, 100 investors
owned 40% of the stock. The Boston industrial community subscribed
heavily and purchased a $5 million assessment. This permitted the
redemption of state financing scrip. 124 Contemporaneously, promoters
appealed to foreign capital (mainly British). However, the state
remained involved in this mixed enterprise. The Commonwealth was
used to market loans. Private loans in 1838 required 8% to 12% interest.
With Massachusetts' backing, the rate dropped to five percent. 125 A
sinking fund was established to retire the debt and the British merchant
bankers Baring Brothers invested $1,890,000 from 1838-1839.126 Bar-
ings sold part of their investment to subscribers ($1.2 million at three
and one-quarter percent above par).' 27 By 1842, the Western Railroad
was capitalized as $3 million in stock ($1 million owned by the state)
and $5 million in bonds ($4 million by the state and $1 million by the
City of Albany). The Boston & Worcester was all stock, privately-held,
comprising $2,700,000.128 Thus, as a corporation imbued with a public
purpose, the B&A was successfully financed with a mixture of private
and public capital.
These railroads radically increased the wealth of the communities
they connected. This in turn increased the frenzy of railroad fever and
promotion. Nonetheless, railroads were good investments. In 1841-
1843, to finance extensive capital improvements, the B&W sold
$700,000 worth of stock. Much of the stock was sold above par to
investors demanding the stock. The railroad's stock had moved from a
speculative investment to a Blue Chip in a ten year period.'29 The West-
ern was a great undertaking, greater than other industrial enterprises
(save railroads in the 1850s).
By 1842, its 160 miles of main line had absorbed more than
$7,000,000, and by 1854, its capital was $10 million. By contrast
even the Erie Canal, which was more than 360 miles long, cost only
$7 million; and only the biggest industrial concerns had as much cap-
122. Id. at 125.
123. Id. at 132.
124. Id. at 140-43.
125. Id. at 147.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 148-49.
128. Id. at 155.
129. Id. at 215.
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ital as $500,000. Even in 1850 in textiles, the most advanced seg-
ment of industry, only forty-one factories had a capitalization of
$250,000 or more.13
0
The Boston & Worcester became a major railroad that spurred the
economy of Massachusetts and the region. It met its capital needs by
relying on a creative mixture of private and public finance. The venture
was so successful that it attracted investors in New England, New York,
and Europe within a short period of time.
The B&A's growth also required new management structures that
supported the widely-dispersed owners and far-flung managers. The
directors, president, and chief engineers created a multi-divisional
authority to run the railroad. This new-fangled management structure
substituted bureaucracy for friendship and kinship. Formal lines of
authority were created, as well as elaborate reporting systems that ena-
bled top managers to make efficient and accurate decisions. The infor-
mal management practices of the partnership and family-owned
businesses had given way to a more scientific, bureaucratic structure that
would benefit from the new system of monitoring and controls.131 The
rise of this management model is detailed in the next section where the
Erie Railroad's contributions are reviewed.
B. The Erie Railroad and Modern Management
The Erie Railroad's revolutionary bureaucratic management struc-
ture set a precedent for the other railroads. The divisional model paved
the way for other great industrial corporations. This shift from hands-
on, owner management of industrial enterprise to administration by pro-
fessional managers supports the shift from the common law model of
management to the plutocratic model. The professional managers pro-
vided governance and controls that were beyond the ken of the typical,
entrepreneur-owned industrial corporation in the mid-1800s. Profes-
sional management, informed by agency law and fiduciary duties, was a
vital proxy for the remote, dispersed shareholder-owners.
As illustrated above, before the advent of railroads, even corporate
industrial concerns were modeled after partnerships. There was a lim-
ited need for capital and owner management provided some protections
for agency problems. Personal networks of kinship and friendship usu-
ally managed these commercial enterprises132 and provided the neces-
sary amounts of credit. Most critical was the question of whether or not
130. Id. at 299, citing EVELYN H. KNOWLTON, PEPPERILL'S PROGRESS: HISTORY OF A CoTToN
TEXTILE COMPANY, 1844-1945 (1948), at 132.
131. Id.
132. RICHARD S. TEDLOW, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION 8-9 (1991).
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a particular person could be trusted. By the 1840s and 1850s, industrial-
ization and commercialization were proceeding apace and railroads were
the reason. Railroad construction and operations were the foundation.
The corporate form was essential for its success:
While the first industrial revolution produced a number of incor-
porated factories, canals, turnpikes, and banks, many of these enter-
prises could have been, and often were, conducted successfully as
partnerships or proprietorships. By contrast, during the second indus-
trial revolution, the corporate form proved to be absolutely essential.
It was a very useful way to aggregate the unprecedented amount of
money required to construct large scale railroads, factories, mills,
refineries, and pipelines, and was also an extremely effective device
for administering the affairs of these enterprises. From a primarily
legal construct, with quasi-public functions, the corporation now
evolved into and inward-looking, private, and very complex organi-
zational hierarchy - a managerial revolution within the private
sector. 133
Railroads were the first great modern businesses. To manage them
properly and to raise the capital needed for their enterprise, complex
organizations were created. These enterprises consumed vast amounts
of money. By 1859, private railroad securities amounted to $1.1 billion.
In contrast, canals built from 1815-1860 cost about $188 million and
about two-thirds of the investment was public. By 1850, railroad securi-
ties offered investors in the public markets a degree of security. Rail-
road finance fueled the volume growth of the exchanges.
The Erie Railroad led the way and spearheaded the managerial
revolution. While traditional family businesses, including industrial
ones, could rely on history and personal relations for management, rail-
roads had large territories that could only be managed by a complex
management structure. By 1855, the Erie was the third largest road in
the United States with operating expenses three times that of the West-
ern. Daniel McCallum, the Erie's very able superintendent, realized that
supervision and management of the road would have to be restructured
from the traditional model of hands-on knowledge by the manager or
superintendent.
McCallum's operating principles constitute the oldest detailed
description of how large corporations must be organized:
1. A proper division of responsibilities.
2. Sufficient power conferred to enable the same to be fully carried
out, that such responsibilities may be real in their character.
133. Id. at 13 n.40 (quoting Thomas K. McCraw, The Evolution of the Corporation in the
United States, in THE BUSINESS CORPORATION: AN INSTITUTION IN TRANSITION 6-7 (John R.
Meyer & James M. Gustafson eds., 1988).
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3. The means of knowing whether such responsibilities are faith-
fully executed.
4. Great promptness i[s] the report of all derelictions of duty, that
evils may be at once corrected.
5. Such information [is] to be obtained through a system of daily
reports and checks that will not embarrass principal officers, nor
lessen their influence with their subordinates.
6. The adoption of a system, as a whole, which will not only enable
the general superintendent to detect errors immediately, but will
also point out the delinquent.
134
To implement his principles, McCallum created the prototypical
division structure: an organization of four divisions (superintendents)
and two branches. These division and branch line superintendents
reported to the general superintendent, who in turn reported to the com-
pany's president. Superintendents were responsible for the operations
and maintenance of their divisions and branches. The Erie management
structure revolutionized the railroad business by standardizing proce-
dures and policies. The division heads functioned as subordinate CEOs.
As a result, the superintendents could give their attention to problems
and bring their personal knowledge to the tasks at hand while resolving
issues in accord with Erie's policies and program.
The Erie model proved to be so successful that it was copied by
other large industries such as iron and steel, the telegraph, and the like.
The divisional management structure was a creative method of solving
the monitoring problem once businesses reached the size of railroads
and steel mills. This solution permitted corporations to grow to gigantic
size because management and control could now be professionalized.
This professionalism by management proxy spurred the separation of
ownership from control in the large, publicly-held companies. The next
section shows how the operations of the capital markets monitored the
public companies while providing a solution to the partnership and small
business hold-up problem that vexed businesses.
IX. THE CAPITAL MARKETS ADDRESS THE HOLD-UP AND
MONITORING PROBLEMS OF BUSINESSES
It seems almost counterintuitive that large capital markets can pro-
vide dispersed investors with a sufficient measure of security to over-
come the hold-up problem and monitoring concerns, but they did in the
nineteenth century and the success in resolving these issues was fol-
lowed by massive investment in the United States, tremendous growth
of businesses and capital stock, and an increase in the nation's wealth.
134. Id. at 17.
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
EXHIBIT 1
Erie Organization Chart Prepared by Daniel C. McCallum
Source: RICHARD S. TEDLOW, CASE COMMENTARY AND TEACHING TECHNIQUE TO
ACCOMPANY THE COMING OF MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM 82 (1985).
Financial institutions were a key to this transformational growth.
Foreign capital became important in the 1830s. By 1853, approximately
$222 million was due to foreign capital investments (19% of American
securities). 3 5 By 1856, the Secretary of the Treasury estimated that for-
eign investment in railroads amounted to $83 million.
3 6 After 1850,137
railroads were:
"able to raise substantial sums in the European market," and the
bulk of foreign investment came after the Civil War. To raise large
sums of capital, which reached millions of dollars per enterprise, rail-
road promoters ... turned mainly to ... merchant-capitalists (in the
United States), who were often to be found among the ranks of their
own stockholders. The companies relied on these private capitalists
to help them in placing railroad stocks and bonds, which.., were the
first industrial securities to be offered publicly in large volume.
Indeed, they were virtually the only ones until the last decades of the
nineteenth century: . . . in the United States, it was only in the 1890s
that manufacturers turned to the stock exchange for outside funds.
138
135. JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER 71 (1999).
136. Id.
137. In the 1850s, railroad investments totaled 6.8 percent of domestic capital stock; by 1860,
they totaled 12.7 percent. COLLEEN A. DUNLAVY, POLITICS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION: EARLY
RAILROADS IN THE UNITED STATES AND PRUSSIA 35 (1994).
138. Id. at 34-35.
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The rise of national banks and a financial system that exported cap-
ital to regions and industries that used it wisely aided development. The
transfer of funds from the capital-rich East to the West contributed to the
growth of modem America. Railroads bound the nation together and
spurred the growth of great metropolises such as New York and Chi-
cago. The urbanization of great cities further accelerated economic
growth and wealth creation as they supported specialization of work.
13 9
The capital transfer helped to meet the demand for tools, housing, com-
munication works, and other infrastructure needs. 40
There was indeed every inducement to accumulate capital, yet
had it not been for the development of financial institutions whose
function it was to mediate between saving and investment, capital
accumulation would have been much more modest. It is true that
surpluses of capital existed in the maturer economies of Western
Europe, where returns were less attractive than in areas of capital
deficit such as the developing American economy. In consequence,
net capital flows into the United States, set in motion primarily by
English investors, amounted to $1.5 billion between 1870 and 1895.
Most of the investments went into municipal and other local bonds
and into railroads and public utilities, although a few manufacturing
firms were among the beneficiaries. Domestic savings substantially
outstripped foreign investment.'
4'
From the 1830s to the 1850s, America experienced a tremendous
increase in capital. Wall Street eclipsed the capital markets of Philadel-
phia and Boston after the late 1840s. In the 1830s, the week's trading
volume high in New York was approximately 1,000 shares. By 1850,
the weekly high reached over one million trades. 142 Also inhabiting the
Street were intermediary institutions known as investment banks or
merchant banks that raised debt and equity capital for businesses.
43
These were the companies that specialized in railroad stocks.'
44
Furthermore, the bond market was integral to railroad construction.
Railroads were risky enterprises and their stock was subject to wild
swings and speculation. Hence, savvy investors wanted the security of
bonds (which, of course, had priority over equity).4 5 Thus, if the rail-
road failed, bondholders could take control of the bankrupt company,
139. For a good history of this rail-driven urban growth, see SARAH H. GORDON, PASSAGE TO
UNION: How THE RAILROADS TRANSFORMED AMERICAN LIFE, 1829-1929, at 267-301 (1990).
140. BRUCHEY, supra note 16, at 312.
141. Id.
142. STROUSE, supra note 135, at 66.
143. Investment banks are instrumental in marketing new public firms and supporting existing
businesses by supplying them with capital they have raised.
144. STROUSE, supra note 135, at 66.
145. Id. at 133.
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reorganize it, and protect their capital. Bonds were especially important
for foreign investors, who could not stomach the gyrations of the mar-
ket. They also needed to be in a position where they could have Ameri-
can representatives communicate their interests as an investor class in
the reorganization.
Railroads had an insatiable need for funds. While the average tex-
tile mill (a large business for its day) seldom cost more than $1 million,
railroads were much more expensive ventures. The Erie, Pennsylvania,
New York Central, and B&O were each capitalized at between $17 mil-
lion and $35 million. 46 By the 1860s, railroads were America's largest
businesses. 4 7 The Pennsylvania Railroad was the largest corporation in
the world with 3,500 miles of track and $61 million in capital
invested.14 8 Capital investment in railroad securities stood at $1.1 bil-
lion in 1859.149
Capital in American railroads continued to rise. It increased from
$2.5 billion in 1870 to $10 billion in 1890.15° Seventy-five thousand
miles of track, greater than any previous decade (or for that matter, any
other place on earth), were laid in the 1880s. 15 1 Railroads had become
reliant on investment banking firms to obtain and invest the funds they
needed for their vast enterprises. Thousands of widely dispersed stock
and bondholders entrusted their funds and savings to the investment
banks that brokered the deals between the capital pools and the giant
railroads. 1
52
Railroads now dominated the landscape. While few firms in 1889
reached the ten million dollar range, the ten largest railroads had over
$100 million in capital each. The 1890 census put the capital invested in
rails at $6.5 billion. 53 Again, rails proved to be good investments. The
average industrial firm (perceived as a riskier investment) traded at three
times its earnings. Railroads were the Blue Chips and they traded at
seven to ten times earnings. 154 Their securities justified those heady val-
146. Id. at 131.
147. GORDON, supra note 104, at 87. Railroad stocks were also good for Wall Street. By
1856, there were 360 railroad stocks traded, 985 bank stocks, hundreds of corporate stocks and
municipals, as well as 75 insurance stocks. Id. The variety of investments permitted
diversification and increased liquidity and safety, ultimately lowering the cost of capital. See
generally Day, supra note 102.
148. STROUSE, supra note 135, at 131.
149. Id. This total is exclusive of land grants and state loans.
150. Id. at 195.
151. Id.
152. Id. These investors looked to the Morgans and Schiffs to monitor and protect their
investments. Foreign capital continued in its importance, with foreign investment rising from
$375 million in 1876 to $1.5 billion in 1883. Id. at 243.




ues as they offered safety in greater liquidity and lower risk.155
To handle and mediate transactions of this scale, new financial
devices were needed.' 56 Wall Street responded by creating mutual sav-
ings banks, mortgage companies, building and loan associations, life
insurance companies, and other firms that were able to funnel surplus
funds into long-term capital investments. 57 American industry was on
the rise. "Industrials" became the dominant stocks on Wall Street by
1900 and the United States, which had imported most of its steel as
recently as 1860, was now producing more steel than all of Europe.
5 8
These developments would not have been as successful or exten-
sive if Wall Street had not managed to develop large corporations with
effective monitoring to curb the hold-up problems facing businesses and
investors. The corporations had the necessary capital to integrate opera-
tions by acquiring suppliers or competitors. Before the advent of Big
Business, family owned concerns and other small industrial or commer-
cial ventures often failed or were thwarted because they lacked the capi-
tal to buyout difficult investors or to deal with other businesses that were
holding them up. With capital that became available to large businesses,
they were in a position to buy out difficult investors and to acquire busi-
nesses such as suppliers and distributors. Such acquisitions would stim-
ulate even more growth and capital creation. The capital markets came
to the rescue by providing the funds that permitted the creation of the
large railroads, steel mills, refineries and the like because these
plutocratic corporations enjoyed the resources to make the required
acquisitions.
Wall Street also helped to solve the hold-up problem for individual
investors by providing monitoring through the exchanges and invest-
ment banking networks.
This constantly increasing demand for capital and the reliance
on foreign investors in turn produced two basic innovations that
appeared in late nineteenth century America in order to maximize the
reputational capital underlying major stock issuances: (1) a corporate
governance system in which investment bankers, originally protect-
155. There is a general relationship between price/earnings ratios and security: the safer the
equity investment, the hi2her the ratio for the. industrial qtock. Thik ik herni p i_ pvetn-l __
purchasing earnings, liquidity, and reasonable growth - a relatively safe and precious commodity
and much in demand; hence, the high prices.
156. Cf Douglas A. Irwin, Tariffs and Growth in Late Nineteenth Century America, 24 WORLD
ECONOMY 15 (2001). "[G]rowth [in the late nineteenth century] was driven largely by labour
force expansion and capital accumulation, while productivity growth was undistinguished when
put in a comparative perspective." Id. at 16. Without the transportation network that rails
afforded, commercial and industrial growth would have been severely stunted.
157. BRUCHEY, supra note 16, at 313.
158. GORDON, supra note 104, at 148.
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ing foreign investors, took seats on the issuer's board both to monitor
management and to protect public investors from predatory raiders
seeking to acquire control by stealth; and (2) the growth of self-regu-
lation through stock exchange rules.' 59
X. THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT BANKERS
The main role of investment bankers in the second half of the nine-
teenth century was the recruitment of foreign capital, with banks "prima-
rily engaged in the marketing of debt securities," 6 ° but eventually
expanding into equity securities. Railroads unified the nation into a con-
tinental common market. The volume of traffic increased throughout
the century, pushing railroad rates down even further and moving even
greater commerce. Railroads were a volume business. Of all the bur-
geoning American industries, railroads profited from economies of
scale. They required high maintenance and high capital CoStS. 16 1 The
tremendous financial needs of the railroads mandated public equity
markets.
Few protections existed for minority shareholders in railroad corpo-
rations. "Not only did control groups quickly form, but in some cases
the objective of these blockholders was primarily to manipulate the
stock price of their corporation."' 162 Professor Coffee cites the example
of the battle for control of the Erie Railroad - the "Scarlet Lady of
Wall Street."'
163
The Erie Railway Wars were emblematic of the legal, moral, and
financial chaos of the times and in the markets. The battle for control of
the Albany and Susquehanna (a road linking Binghamton to the Albany
gateway to New England) at the annual board of directors' election fea-
tured Cornelius Vanderbilt and his allies against Jay Gould, Jim Fisk,
and their associates. A young J. P. Morgan advised the New York Cen-
159. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in
the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (2001).
160. Id. at 27.
161. JoHN, STEELE GORDON, THE SCARLET WOMAN OF WALL STREET: JAY GOULD, JIM FISK,
CORNELIUS VANDERBILT, THE ERIE RAILWAY WARS, AND THE BIRTH OF WALL STREET 124
(1988).
162. Coffee, supra note 159, at 27.
163. Id. at 27-28. For other sources, see Jay Gould's contemporary, CHARLES FRANCIS
ADAMS, JR., CHAPTERS OF ERIE (1871); see also GORDON, supra note 161 (This is a lively history
of the battle for control of the Erie. Commodore Vanderbilt, the dominant shareholder of the New
York Central System, attempted to gain control of the Erie in order to protect his trunk line.), and
MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 77-98 (1986) (sympathetic, revisionist
biography of the great nineteenth century robber baron Jay Gould). While Jay Gould was
generally thought of as a villain by most, his control of the Erie was salubrious, however. Before
Gould, the physical plant was run-down and the debt was staggering. Gould's astute management
rendered the Erie a much stronger property. KLEIN at 88-102, 115-16, 119-21.
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tral faction (Vanderbilt's forces). 16 4 The meeting was attended by share-
holders, lawyers, employees, proxy holders, process servers, and thugs.
The company treasurer was arrested for stealing the subscription books.
After papers were served and two separate elections held, each with a
different victor, the battle moved to the courts. Morgan had the case
tried in the friendly confines of Delhi, N.Y., not Albany or New York
City, and the trial judge ruled in his favor on all counts. The Court of
Appeals, however, reversed the decision in its entirety, except on the
critical issue of who had won the election. 165 Grievous harm had been
done. Jeremiah Black, a former Attorney General of the United States,
wrote:
A moment's attention to this will ... show that the confusion,
misapprehension, and total failure of justice which took place in these
cases, while they could not possibly have happened in any other
country, could scarcely have been avoided in New York... all par-
164. This may have convinced Pierpont Morgan that internecine warfare like the Erie brawl
was "no way to run a railroad." "The Morgans [father and son] hated this kind of warfare, which
played havoc with national financial markets and left their client-investors holding worthless
paper. Hoping to transform railroad securities from high-risk speculations into stable, long-term
investments, they and a few other bankers ... attempted to discipline the industry. The fact that
railroads continually needed huge infusions of capital put the bankers in a powerful position."
STROUSE, supra note 135, at 134. Pierpont "saw himself as a proxy for honorable European and
American investors, a tool of transcendent purpose representing the sound men on Wall Street and
in the City." RON CHEROW, THE HouSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND
THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 30 (1990). See also id. at 44, 45.
Pierpont spent much of his life trying to consolidate railroads, regularize rates, and manage
ruinous competition. STROUSE, supra note 135, at 198 (The heads of the Wabash, New York
Central, and Erie in 1880 met "'with a view of making permanent running arrangements' - that
is, agreeing to divide up traffic rather than wage war." [The Wabash and Erie were Gould roads!])
Morgan's quest to rationalize and consolidate the trunk lines was quashed in Northern Securities
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (Sherman Antitrust Act applied to stock ownership.
Northern Securities Company, holding the stock of three major railroads, was dissolved.).
The Erie Wars were costly; they gave all participants a black eye. Finally, they helped to fix
the rapacious image of robber barons in the public's eye.
165. The Susquehanna War litigation was both complex and protracted. In People v. Albany &
Susquehanna Railroad Co., 7 Abb. Pr. (N.S.) 265, 38 How. Pr. 228, 1 Lans. 308, 55 Barb. 344
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1869) Smith, J. sustained the election of the Ramsey board (Vanderbilt/Morgan-
backed) and disallowed the election of the Church board (Fisk/Gould-backed) on the grounds of
fraud. The Fisk directors appealed Judge Smith's decision. The General Term of the Supreme
Court sustained the Ramsey Board election and vacated much of the Smith decision on technical
grounds dealing with the right to a jury trial and costs. People v. Albany & Susauehanna R.R. Ca.:
5 Lans. 25 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1871). Resort by all parties was had to the Court of Appeals which
eventually sustained the Smith finding of fraudulent conduct by the Fisk/Gould faction. People v.
Albany & Susquehanna R.R. Co., 57 N.Y. 161 (1874). The Susquehanna Wars litigation had
come to an end, almost as an anticlimax.
The defeat of Fisk and Gould in the 1869 Supreme Court litigation left the Ramsey board in
control. In February in 1870 it leased the railroad to the Hudson & Delaware Canal company (the
predecessor to the Delaware & Hudson Railroad), ending the ability of the Erie to mount a
challenge at the New York Central's Albany gateway. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR., supra note
163, at 190.
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ties were fighting under the ensign of public authority. It was judicial
power subverting order and breaking the peace; it was law on a ram-
page; it was justice bedeviled; in one word, it was the New York
Code in full operation.' 66
Harper's Weekly intoned on point that the judiciary must be
reformed: "If scenes of anarchy are to be avoided, if New York is to
retain its preeminence as the commercial metropolis of the country, if
foreign capital is to be retained here, something must be done to prevent,
in the future, the unseemly abuses of power into which certain of our
state judges have been betrayed in the past."' 6 7
Thuggery did not end with the Susquehanna War. Consider the
plight of foreign investors with the audacity to entertain lawsuits in New
York to enforce their rights. English shareholders, who owned 450,000
of the 780,000 shares issued and outstanding (and hence, control of the
company in a society ruled by law), were purposely prevented from vot-
ing for their slate of directors in the 1870 board election. Gould's forces
won by a landslide vote of 304,938 to 3,000.168 The English sharehold-
ers then went to both state and federal court to overturn the fraudulent
election. In July 1871, a year after they began their odyssey, the inves-
tors obtained a federal district court judgment in their favor.' 69 How-
ever, they had to wait until December 1871, after yet another fraudulent
election, before Gould would finally be compelled to turn over the stock
to them. This battle cost the investors $25,000 and the loss of control
for well over a year. Foreign investors also turned to the corrupt legisla-
166. GORDON, supra note 161, at 252 n.23 (citing Jeremiah S. Black, untitled article, GALAXY
MAGAZINE, Mar. 1872).
167. Id. at 252-53 n.24 (citing HARPER'S WEEKLY, Feb. 12, 1870).
168. Id. at 299-300. At the time, Gould and his allies controlled the Erie. They accepted the
money from the English investors, but never officially transferred the stock on the company's
books to the investors or their representatives, leaving them without the right to vote in the
election.
169. There are four federal cases in this critical litigation to vindicate the rights of English
shareholders. The key case, Erie Railway Co. v. Heath, 8 F. Cas. 762 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871), was
decided in July 1871 and ordered Gould's agents to register the stock certificates in the names of
their English owners, giving them the franchise. Erie Railway Co. v. Heath, 8 F. Cas. 761
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) was a mandamus action ordering Gould's agents to produce the stock
transfer book and other corporate records. Erie Railway Co. v. Heath, 8 F. Cas. 763
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) denied the petition of Gould's agents for control of unregistered stock
certificates. Finally, Erie Railway Co. v. Heath, 8 F. Cas. 766 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) ordered
payment to the master for supervising recording of stock certificates in the names of their rightful
owners.
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ture, 7 ° which refused to repeal the Classification Act, 7 ' ostensibly
because of the threat of foreign ownership. 72 Such shenanigans surely
depressed stock prices, harmed all investors, and raised the cost of
capital.
In the absence of any federal regulations, different laws and judicial
rulings from separate states often came into conflict with one another,
"but the real point is that investors were vulnerable less because of the
substantive inadequacy of American corporate law itself than because of
the lack of enforcement mechanisms and the prospect of corruption."'
73
Thus, in the nineteenth century, it was very difficult for investors to
enforce their contract rights through litigation (or even lobbying for reg-
ulation). 74 The transaction costs of a Londoner or San Franciscan liti-
gating in New York or Boston were steep. There was also a substantial
"home court advantage." With no federal regulation of the capital mar-
kets and difficult to enforce substantive rights, another monitoring
device was required to attract capital and bring confidence to investors.
In such a chaotic legal environment filled with corruption, invest-
ment banks had to create a system of governance that would assure for-
eign investors that their investments would be secure. J. P. Morgan &
Co. "pioneered" the technique of placing a partner of the investment
170. In the Gilded Age, New York legislators were paid the princely sum of $3.00 per day.
These Solons supplemented their salary by taking bribes to pass legislation. The rate on important
bills ranged between $2,000 and $3,000. GORDON, supra note 161, at 185. Bribes were the only
way to do business with such a corrupt legislature and legislation was required for railroad
charters and key amendments to charters, such as additional routes, etc.
171. The Erie Classification Act of 1869 was enacted to make it difficult to dislodge directors
by shareholder vote. The Act provided for classification of directors into five groups, staggering
their election over five years. KLEIN, supra note 163, at 98. (Modem practice permits only three
tiers of classification. Management still employs classified boards to thwart hostile takeovers.)
Gould's inspiration was the Pennsylvania Classification Act, created to rebuff his attack on
the Pennsylvania Railroad. The Erie Classification Act perpetuated Gould's control at a time
when the legislature was poised to remove its stock printing privileges that had been employed to
great success in the past. GORDON, supra note 161, at 228, 230.
172. Id. at 299-301.
173. Coffee, supra note 159, at 28.
174. Domestically the nation witnessed a rapid acceleration of the trend to economic
concentration that had begun after the Civil War. In the last third of the nineteenth century the
corporation emerged as the dominant form of indi rtnl oranni7tion in the United Qt, th.
by 1890, 65 percent of the goods manufactured in the country were turned out by corporations,
and by 1900, 79 percent were. At the same time that the percentage of corporate producers was
thus increasing, the stock of many large corporations became publicly held and the ownership so
dispersed that no one stockholder had much of a say in how the corporation was operated. The
result of this phenomenon was that a class of corporate managers grew up: While they were
legally responsible to the stockholders, that latter body was so numerous that many important
corporate decisions were made by the managers themselves without any thought of obtaining
advance authorization from the stockholders. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 103
(2001).
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firm on the board of the corporation. 175 Morgan and other underwriters
"first imposed the discipline of both periodic and inclusive financial
reports," while, "Wall Street ... required the accountants to certify these
reports." '17 6 During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, virtu-
ally every major U.S. railroad developed close ties with one or more
U.S. investment banking firms and the practice of partners from invest-
ment banks and officers of commercial banks going on the railroad's
board became institutionalized.' 77 A major investment banking firm on
a corporation's board "offered mutual advantages both to the minority
investors and to the corporate management by protecting both from the
prospect of a stealth attack by a corporate raider seeking to acquire con-
trol without paying a control premium." 1 78 J. P. Morgan and other
investment bankers consequently increased the importance of the Street
to the world's economy and provided an atmosphere of solidity and
integrity that the markets needed.
179
A similar transfer of power to the market did not take place in
Europe. Financial institutions like J. P. Morgan either did not exist, or
were too small to underwrite such large equity risks. In addition, they
represented far fewer foreign and domestic clients.180 Moreover, there
was no great merger wave as there was in the United States from 1895 to
1903 after the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.81 The Act
"prohibited price-fixing and collusion among competitors, thereby out-
lawing the cartel-like structure that characterized many American indus-
tries."' 182 In order to circumvent this prohibition, companies engaged in
horizontal mergers to create monopolies that could better control prices.
For example, in 1901, J. P. Morgan orchestrated the merger of eight
competing steel companies to form U.S. Steel, the largest corporation in
the world at the time. There was no similar incentive for British compa-
nies to merge in the same fashion, especially since British courts were
not aggressive in the prohibition of cartels or price-fixing.
183
175. Coffee, supra note 159, at 29-30.
176. GORDON, supra note 161, at 291.
177. Coffee, supra note 159, at 30.
178. Id. at 31-32 (for example, J.P. Morgan in the 1869 "Susquehanna War").
179. GORDON, supra note 104, at 153.
180. Coffee, supra note 159, at 32.
181. Id. at 33. See also Cheffins, supra note 3 (the merger wave from 1895-1903 was critical
in the establishment of dispersed ownership and the separation of ownership from control).




XI. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE AS GUARDIAN OF THE
PUBLIC INVESTOR
Three important points should be noted about the early history of
the New York Stock Exchange: (1) activism in governance, such as that
of the NYSE, was not the norm for other stock exchanges around the
world; 84 (2) the NYSE, unlike with debt securities, "did not possess a
de facto monopoly position in trading equity securities as of the late
nineteenth century;"' 85 and (3) the NYSE's activism "seems directly
attributable to its organizational structure and its competitive posi-
tion." '186 Before 1900, "'the Boston Stock Exchange was the principal
market for industrial securities,"' due to the underwriting of New
England textile mills and early railroad corporations.' 87
There were several key differences between the NYSE and the
London Stock Exchange (LSE). The first difference was the ability of
new companies to be listed on the exchange. The NYSE was a very
closed system, while the LSE was wide open. 188  For example,
"[b]etween 1850 and 1905, the membership of the LSE rose from 864 to
5,567. In sharp contrast, the membership of the NYSE stayed constant
between 1879 and 1914 at 1,100. ' 189 A company could only enter the
NYSE by buying the seat of an existing member. This closed system
provided several incentives which the LSE's open system did not: (1)
"the growth of large, diversified financial services firms (such as J. P.
Morgan & Co.)"; 190 (2) the favoring of self-regulation to protect the
value of a member's seat; and (3) the fragmentation of U.S. equity mar-
kets into higher and lower quality tiers, which promoted competition
between exchanges. 19'
A second difference between the NYSE and LSE was the member-
ship rules: "NYSE member firms could raise capital from outsiders -
known as 'special partners' - and not all partners in a firm were
required to be members of the exchange. In contrast, the LSE required
all partners in a firm to be members of the exchange and further prohib-
ited every member from engaging in any other businesses."' 92 The





189. Id. at 34-35.
190. Id. at 35.
191. Id. The NYSE specialized in top-tier firms (and still does). Therefore, it vetted the
quality of firms for the dispersed investors.
192. Id. On the surface, the LSE seems more in tune with contemporary notions of "free"
markets (more access, lower costs of access, competitive commissions, etc.). This notion makes
perfect sense in the Information Age with the Internet and federal and exchange disclosure
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NYSE's rules allowed U.S. firms to grow much larger, with better capi-
talization, than their British counterparts (at least five times larger).
93
A third difference was each exchange's position on the issue of
"competitive versus fixed brokerage commissions."' 94 Into the late
nineteenth century, the NYSE had fixed commissions, while the LSE
permitted variable commissions. 95 The NYSE's fixed commission pol-
icy increased the cost of trading and generated lower trading volumes,
driving the lower priced stocks off of the exchange, which gave the gen-
eral public the perception that such stocks were lower in quality and
higher in risk. The policy also forced the NYSE to "limit itself to a
high-volume, high-quality business" in order to meet minimum commis-
sions. The limitation also came out of fear that "listing high-volatility
stocks would invite predictable insolvencies among its members" (e.g.,
mining or petroleum companies). Therefore, the NYSE regularly
rejected issuer applications, "either because the issuer lacked an ade-
quate earnings track record, had insufficient assets, or was in a high-risk
industry."' 96
Finally, one of the most important developments of the NYSE was
its mandatory disclosure policy for members, even in the absence of any
formal law. In fact, "some financial historians date the advent of mod-
em financial reporting from 1900, not from 1933, when the federal
securities laws were first adopted."' 97 Serious self-regulation may actu-
ally have been inaugurated somewhat earlier following the Erie Wars
debacle. Wall Street realized that without supervision and monitoring, it
could lose its position in the global capital markets.' 98 Its close monitor-
ing acted as a functional equivalent for future securities regulations,
something not present with the LSE. One of the most important reforms
was proscribing directors from selling their firms short.' 99 Short-selling
by directors and other insiders personified by the likes of Daniel Drew,
the "Speculative Director" of the Erie, destabilized the market and led
reasonable investors to conclude the market was rigged. Honesty and
such regulation were good for business - a corrupt market drives away
investors who fear losing their investments to fraud, countenanced by
corrupt brokers. An honest market boosts sales and commissions and
requirements. However, one must remember that the nineteenth century did not have these tools
and markets were susceptible to misinformation by sharp operators. Therefore, the monitoring
performed by investment bankers and the NYSE was most beneficial.
193. Id. at 37.
194. Id. at 35.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 37.
197. Id.
198. GORDON, supra note 161, at 212-13.
199. Id. at 278.
[Vol. 58:525
PARTNER TO PLUTOCRAT
leads to increased liquidity and investment. Self-regulation would help
New York to surpass London as the dominant capital market within two
generations.2 °
Consequently, by the end of the nineteenth century, the investment
banking firms, led by J. P. Morgan & Co. and the NYSE, developed
successful methods of monitoring corporate activity and protecting dis-
persed shareholders from predatory practices of speculators and Wall
Street insiders.2 0 '
Corporate investors adopted the plutocratic model because it pro-
vided liquidity. Diversified shareholders were able to counteract the
hold-up problem because they could diversify and liquidate their invest-
ment. America's capital needs were so great for its first major industries
- railroads - that local subscriptions and even state subscriptions
could not provide enough capital. The United States was fortunate that
it lagged behind Western Europe in its development. There was a capi-
tal surplus in England and a capital surplus on the Continent because
they had already developed their railroads and canals and the rates of
return were lower than what was being offered in the United States.
Therefore, the United States enjoyed a flow of surplus capital from
Europe to capital centers - Boston, New York, Philadelphia, etc. -
and then into the hinterlands to develop infrastructure. In effect,
America had people with money, whether they were wealthy Europeans
or wealthy Wall Street bankers, putting money at risk in "foreign"
territory.
Economically and politically, these investors demanded the one
share/one vote structure because it provided them with the huge corpora-
tion staffed by professional managers. There was no way for investors
to do the type of local supervision that had been possible with the small
mines, cotton mills, textile mills, and shipping ventures a half century
earlier. These investors were too remote from the business, but they
accepted the separation of ownership from control because the board
could hire professional managers and raise the capital the business
required. Investors also demanded and received monitoring through
their representatives, their lawyers, and investment bankers. These
200. Id. at 213.
201. Obviously, not all skullduggeries, such as pools and insider trading, etc., were curbed.
That would be attended to at a later time with the passage of the federal securities acts in the
1930s. Another drawback to the monitoring system was the lack of modem accounting and
financial standards. That, too, would come later. However, even with these additions and
reforms, determined wrongdoers can still undermine the confidence of the markets, as seen with
Tyco, WorldCom, HealthSouth, and Enron - some of the largest debacles of the modem era.
Nevertheless, the monitoring by investment bankers and the exchanges went a long way toward
creating modem, trustworthy capital markets that gained the confidence of atomistic investors in
great corporations.
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monitors protected the corporation and as a result, provided the basis for
the liquidity investors called for.
Simultaneously, due to a large amount of money being organized
and liquefied, was the development of financial intermediaries -
investment banking firms, insurance companies, and a number of other
institutions that helped to channel funds and act as guardians. Hence,
there was a massive inflow of capital during the nineteenth century, with
a lot of it coming from both Europe and the capital centers of the United
States. This flood of money was predicated upon the plutocratic model
changes in the markets and massively lowered the cost of doing business
as money is a commodity that becomes cheaper and leads to even
greater investment and economic growth.
XI1. CONCLUSION
In the nineteenth century, America created an exceptionally differ-
ent economic society from that which it had emerged. Hamilton's eco-
nomic plans were of critical importance. They placed the United States
on a firm footing that led to a flood of European and domestic capital.
They laid the foundation for a finance-led industrial expansion.
Businesses were transformed by evolving capital markets. These
markets provided a liquidity that funded the railroads, America's first
great national industry.2"' Railroads were not only unique large busi-
nesses that advanced transportation; they opened up national markets.
Railroads were the means leading to profound changes in corporate
management and finance. This financial blueprint was replicated in the
development of steel, refining, and other great industries.
American businesses evolved, in a short period of time, from
closely controlled partnerships and corporations to the prudent mean,
mixed management model. The final stage in the nineteenth century
development of business was the dynamic, plutocratic corporation. This
entity featured diversified shareholding, board control, and divisional
management. While the investor surrendered much control and proprie-
tary interest in choosing the plutocratic corporation, the benefits have
been enormous to the owners and society.
202. Coffee, supra note 159, at 27.
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